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Perhaps only a political scientist would regard as "controversial"
the proposition that there is a politics of regulation.' Consider some
recent events: Congress nearly emasculated the Federal Trade Com-
mission. 2 Deregulation initiatives3 generated fierce and protracted op-
position from regulated interests. New regulatory proposals, 4 and
once-obscure regulatory appointments, produced hard-fought battles.
Even regulatory-reform proposals directed at administrative technique
and judicial review-hardly the stuff of which political controversy is
ordinarily made-became mired in prolonged conflict.5 In truth, regu-
lation has become the Stalingrad of domestic political warfare.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 357
(J. Wilson ed. 1980) [book hereinafter cited without cross-reference].
2. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 181, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1979)
(recommending legislative veto of agency rules, exemption of savings and loan associa-
tions from agency jurisdiction, and prohibition of agency actions under Lanham Trade-
mark Act); SENATE CoMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMIssION Acr OF 1979, S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1979) (proposing limi-
tation of FTC regulation of insurance business, commercial advertising, and used car
warranties).
3. E.g., Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980); Railroad
Transportation Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
4. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.501-.607 (1979) (Hill-Burton
Act regulations). The Hill-Burton Act regulations were challenged in American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Harris, 477 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (denying motion for preliminary injunc-
tion against regulations taking effect).
5. E.g., S. 401, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Regulatory Cost Reduction Act of 1981)
(providing, inter alia, for judicial review of regulatory impact analysis); S. 67, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1981) (providing for de
novo review of agency interpretations of statutes, eliminating any presumption of validity
of agency regulations, and imposing more demanding standard of review on agency
actions). Each of these measures was the subject of considerable controversy during the
Ninety-sixth Congress, S. 67 having actually passed the Senate.
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How is this battle actually being waged? What is at stake? What
is the likely outcome? In The Politics of Regulation, Harvard po-
litical scientist James Q. Wilson seeks to shed light on these ques-
tions. He has commissioned nine essays on individual regulatory and
enforcement programs, adding a magisterial essay of his own that at-
tempts to integrate the major implications of the case studies into a
broad theoretical perspective on regulatory politics and behavior. To
the meager regulatory theories that now underlie discourse on the
subject, Wilson would add more enriching fare.
I
By insisting on a distinctive politics of regulation, Wilson is not
simply reiterating the obvious. He is stalking bigger game: the "eco-
nomic" theory of regulation advanced by the economist George Stig-
ler,6 and "political" theories advanced by political scientists such as
Theodore Lowi7 and Marver Bemstein.8
In classic Chicago-school fashion, Stigler's theory holds that regula-
tion is wholly epiphenomenal. The activity of regulation is not ac-
tuated by autonomous political or ideological factors; rather, it re-
flects the play of market forces. In this view, firms seek to preserve
or expand their market shares by demanding protection from com-
petition. Politicians, responding to this demand, supply influence,
legal authority, and a regulatory apparatus that imposes costs, often
at prohibitive levels, on actual or potential competitors of the regu-
lated firms. The agency, by building walls around the regulated sec-
tor, resembles a medieval lord who protects the economic interests
of those sellers fortunate or prescient enough to have already gained
shelter within the citadel. Consumers must either pay the monopolistic
prices that the sheltered firms can command or manage to do without.
Of course, politicians in the legislature and in the agency can pre-
scribe legal rules capable of constraining the market power of regu-
lated firms. In deciding whether and how to exercise this control,
however, politicians seek to maximize their self-interest. They know
that organizational and political activity generates different costs and
benefits for different interests,9 that regulated firms can better bear
those costs and reap those benefits than consumers, and that firms
6. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT
Scr. 1 (1971).
7. See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 125-56 (1969).
8. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 263-67 (1955).
9. See m. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 21, 33-36 (rev. ed. 1971).
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can more easily furnish politicians what they most desire-political,
programmatic, and financial support of various kinds, and a secure
job upon retirement from public life.' 0 Accordingly, politicians succor
the regulated firms and neglect the consumer. The agency becomes
the communications center of an ongoing cartel, the signaling appara-
tus for a legalized conspiracy in restraint of trade. The relationship
of regulatory agency to regulated industry becomes one of abject sub-
ordination, a debasement reflected in rhetorical metaphors: "inden-
tured servant," "tool," and "captive."
In contrast to Stigler's concern with the economic calculations of
politicians and regulated firms, other students of regulation empha-
size techniques of political influence: the formation of coalitions, the
weaving of intricate networks of influence over agency officials, the
appointment of sympathetic officials, the interplay of legal rules and
discretion, and the manipulation of symbols.". Yet political and eco-
nomic theories of regulatory behavior predict much the same thing:
domination by regulated interests over the personnel, policies, and
performance of regulatory agencies.
Since the mid-1960s, this shared academic view of regulatory be-
havior has shaped the attitudes of policymakers, scholars, "public in-
terest" activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. Doubtless, this in-
fluence is attributable less to the popularity of the Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science and of the classics of antipluralist
political science than it is to the efforts of enterprising, politically
active observers of regulation, who have found congenial the the-
orists' descriptive propositions, if not always their policy prescriptions.
Ralph Nader and his epigones,'12 "consumer oriented" congressional
committees and their burgeoning staffs,' 3 investigative journalists,'
14
and others in positions of influence have distilled from these theories
several essential premises that constitute a kind of reformer's creed.
First, the behavior of a regulatory agency, and indeed of government
10. See Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 85-86 (1969);
Stigler, supra note 6, at 12-13.
11. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 278-79; M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES
OF POLITICS 188-94 (1977); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 1-26 (1962);
T. LOWI, supra note 7, at 288-97.
12. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 311-25 (1970); J.
TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST 3-4 (1970).
13. See, e.g., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMs. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, H.R. Doc. No.
134, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG.,
IST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION (Comm. Print 1977) (five volumes).
14. See, e.g., L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS 29-128 (1969); M. MINTZ & J. COHEN,
AMERICA, INC. 237-53 (1971).
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in general, is determined by the political power of those interests
seeking to influence it. Second, the political power of those interests
depends on their economic resources (for example, dollars, lawyers,
control over jobs) and on their special access to politicians. Third,
regulatory politics is at bottom a Manichean struggle between a dis-
crete and powerful "corporate interest" and an equally well-defined,
but politically feeble, consumer (or "public") interest. Finally, that
struggle, which is nothing but the interaction of those two vectors of
force, leads to only one, melancholy outcome.
This creed, elaborated and embellished in a rhetoric suitable for
public consumption, was rendered as a theory of agency "capture."
The theory soon acquired the commanding status of conventional
wisdom, confidently asserted and rarely questioned. So powerful did
its dominion become that an entire generation of congressional staff-
ers, political activists, journalists, and students has come to political
maturity armed with its certitudes.
The capture theory could not have taken hold as it did, of course,
had it not accurately and vividly described the conditions of many,
perhaps most, regulatory agencies in the early 1970s. Certainly, the
symptoms of regulatory pathology to which we have become so ac-
customed-stifled competition, gross inefficiency, hostility to public
participation in agency processes, frustration of innovation, adminis-
trative chaos and delay, secrecy, absence of long-range planning, and
indifference to competing social objectives-amply justified the jere-
miads of the agencies' critics, as most of the case studies in the Wilson
volume confirm. George Stigler, Theodore Lowi, and Ralph Nader
could find overwhelming evidence for their indictments in the Civil
Aeronautics Board's refusal to certify new trunk lines,' its unau-
thorized imposition of a route moratorium,1 6 and its flagrantly il-
legal administration of the fare structure.' 7 Similar support could be
found in the Food and Drug Administration's failure to implement
the efficacy requirements of the 1962 drug legislation,18 and in much
other regulatory misbehavior.
Nevertheless, even the most ardent capture theorist should have
been struck by certain persistent anomalies and contradictory data.
Many old-line regulatory agencies, for example, had succeeded ad-
15. See Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION at 75, 88.
16. See id. at 97-98.
17. See Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (tariffs established through
cooperation of airlines and CAB without public notice and hearing were unlawful).
18. See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 (D.D.C. 1972).
705
The Yale Law Journal
mirably in performing some of the statutory tasks that Congress had
thrust upon them. They had nurtured fledgling transportation in-
dustries in a developing economy, created a vast and intricate com-
munications network to unify a far-flung people, and protected re-
gional and rural interests in an increasingly urban society. If some
inefficiency was the price of these achievements, who could say that
the redistributional gains did not justify it?' 9 Who could say that
messy political, administrative, and operational facts not easily incor-
porated into economists' models did not appropriately shape agency
behavior? If the agencies now seemed anachronistic, was that because
conditions had changed or because economists' theories had changed?
More important, the capture theory could not readily explain cer-
tain stubborn regulatory patterns. The Federal Power Commission
(FPC), for example, had long maintained rates for interstate natural
gas far below the levels prevailing in the intrastate market, thereby
discouraging production and encouraging wasteful uses,20 hardly a
strategy calculated to endear the FPC to politically well-connected
producers. If the FPC was indeed captured, its captors must have
been those consumers in the nonproducing states fortunate enough
to be hooked into a utility system with long term supply contracts.
Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had be-
come the scourge of the corporate community, regulating it vigorously
in the interests of the uninformed investor. The Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), established in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare shortly after the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, had
been remarkably effective in securing the racial integration of south-
ern schools by the early 1970s despite well-organized, politically po-
tent opposition.2 1 Did consumers of natural gas, small investors, and
southern blacks possess economic power or political influence that
had somehow escaped notice, an influence capable of dictating policy?
Were the FPC, SEC, and OCR merely exceptions that proved the
rule of agency subservience to the regulated? Or was the conventional
wisdom simply wrong?
The answer was not long in doubt. The anomalies proliferated so
19. Welfare economists traditionally define a point B as Pareto superior to point A
if efficiency gains are so great that gainers could compensate losers and still be better
off at point B than at point A. Politicians, however, may properly conclude that such
a move is not acceptable unless the losers are actually compensated by the gainers, and
that where this transfer is not feasible, point A is to be preferred to point B despite
B's greater efficiency.
20. See S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER CONI-
MISSION 69-72 (1974).
21. See Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION at 304, 312-13.
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rapidly during the Nixon-Ford years that the capture theory's pre-
dictions became more exception than rule. Administrations profound-
ly sympathetic to corporate interests actively supported or acquiesced
in a veritable flood of new regulatory programs that business bitterly
opposed.22 Between 1970 and 1975, at least thirty important regulatory
statutes were enacted, establishing new agencies and vastly expanding
the authority of existing ones.23 In many of those measures, the hands
of Ralph Nader and of other capture theorists were plainly visible. 24
When the Carter Administration acceded to power in 1977, this regu-
latory establishment, swollen to unimagined dimensions, was entrusted
to many former (and perhaps future) public interest activists.2 5 Strong-
ly committed to the ideologies of consumerism, environmentalism, and
community action, those individuals accepted uncritically the premises
of the capture theory, even though they had devoted their careers to
struggling against its political implications. Their official positions
now confirmed its inadequacy. Far from feeling indentured to the
regulated industries, those officials were profoundly suspicious of them,
if not actually hostile. They quickly seized the opportunity to act on
those suspicions. 26
The capture theory was devastated by these remarkable develop-
ments;2 7 even refinements in the theory could not rehabilitate it. It
was plausible to think, for example, that agencies that regulate many
industries, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, might be less vulnerable to capture than
those that regulate only one, but this notion left unexplained the
22. For example, the Nixon Administration actively supported federal regulation of
environmental quality and occupational health and safety, albeit in a somewhat different
form than the statutes ultimately enacted by Congress. See Kelman, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, in THE POLICS oF REGULATION at 236, 241-42; Marcus, En-
vironmental Protection Agency, in THE PoLIcs OF REGULATION at 267, 273.
23. See Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation," PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1977, at 49.
24. See, e.g., Katzmann, Federal Trade Commission, in THE POLITCS OF REGULATION
at 152, 177, 423 nn.61-63 (reorganization of FTC in early 1970s reflected recommendations
of Nader report and ABA Commission study); Marcus, supra note 22, at 270-72 (1970
clean-air amendments significantly influenced by Ralph Nader).
25. Prominent examples include Joan Claybrook, a fierce critic of the automobile
industry who became its safety regulator as head of the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration; Michael Pertschuk, who designed much of the consumer legisla-
tion of the 1960s and 1970s as a Senate aide and became chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission; and Carol Tucker Foreman, a consumer activist and bete noire of the food
industry who became its regulator as Assistant Secretary for Food and Consumer Affairs
in the Department of Agriculture.
26. See, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (upholding refusal of FTC Chairman
Pertschuk, who advocated regulation of television advertising in speeches, interviews, and
periodicals, to excuse himself from rulemaking proceedings).
27. Wilson, supra note I, at 361-63.
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deregulation policies of several single-industry agencies, such as the
Federal Communications Commission under Chairman Charles Ferris,
the Interstate Commerce Commission under Chairmen Dan O'Neal
and Darius Gaskins, and the Civil Aeronautics Board under Chair-
men John Robson, Alfred Kahn, and Marvin Cohen.28 Another con-
tention, that changes such as deregulation are merely cosmetic, was
belied by the fierce opposition that those policy shifts in fact aroused
among some of America's most powerful corporations and unions and
their congressional allies.
29
Prevailing theories, it appears, cannot begin to explain much of the
observed political reality of the last decade. How, then, are we to
understand it? Wilson provides us with some guidance, but we can-
not evaluate his offering without first considering an element of regu-
latory politics to which his essay devotes surprisingly little attention:
the changing character of regulation since 1965.
I have mentioned the striking fact that many who most vigorously
attacked the performance and legitimacy of the regulatory apparatus
prior to 1977 soon found themselves in firm control of its machinery.
From their official perches, they administered a regulatory domain
vastly enlarged through their own heroic efforts. Is this result para-
doxical? I think not. It rather reflects dynamic forces that animated
the regulatory explosion of the 1970s and will, mutatis mutandis, con-
tinue to shape the regulatory politics of the 1980s. Three forces are
especially noteworthy. First, a distinctive mode of public intervention,
so-called "social" regulation, has emerged with unique political, so-
cial, and economic characteristics. Second, markets have evolved in
ways highly subversive of old-line "economic" regulation and highly
conducive to social regulation. Third, important institutions have
developed in ways likely to sustain and augment these forces.
Social Regulation. Proponents of the new regulation, many of whom
adhere to the capture theory, stress that it differs fundamentally from
the old regulation of the New Deal era.30 They point out that "eco-
nomic" or cartel regulation of a market was designed to control
rates, entry, and basic patterns of service, that by suppressing com-
petitive forces, such regulation often generated substantial efficiency
losses and distributional inequities, and that its legal and administra-
28. See Behrman, supra note 15, at 104-20 (discussing CAB deregulation).
29. See id. at 117-20. Preliminary indications are that their opposition may not have
been myopic. See Pace, '80 Airlines Loss to be a Record, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1980, § D,
at 1, col. 6 (domestic airlines reported losses of between $150 and $200 million during
1980).
30. See M. GREEN & N. TWAITZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON THE LAW at iii (1979).
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tive machinery was so susceptible to industry manipulation that it
amounted to "corporate socialism," pernicious in origin31 and per-
verse in execution. The newer "social" regulation, in contrast, was
designed to enhance health, safety, the environment, equal oppor-
tunity, and the quality of life. By internalizing the social costs gen-
erated by private decisions, it would minimize them. Innovative le-
gal and administrative arrangements would ensure that capture did
not occur. Social regulation would not simply yield economic effi-
ciency; it was, above all, an essential element of a just and humane
society, protecting those most vulnerable to the depredations inevi-
table in an industrial setting. With perfect consistency, then, reform-
ers could oppose economic regulation and support social regulation.
If the aspirations implicit in the theoretical foundations of social
regulation could readily be implemented, the politics of regulation
would almost certainly have taken a very different form than it has.
In fact, this account, though accurate as far as it goes, neglects im-
portant political, economic, and administrative dimensions of social
regulation that determine the nature and scope of regulatory conflict.
Of these, I shall discuss four.
First, most programs of social regulation confer exceedingly broad
regulatory authority, often extending to all industries in the society,
all firms doing business with the government, or all federally assisted
activities. The ambit of social regulation, then, far exceeds that of
classic economic regulation, which embraced firms within only a
single industry. Cross-industry jurisdiction may well reduce the like-
lihood that the agency will be captured by any particular industry,
but it also raises certain obstacles to effective regulation: the need for
(and paucity of) information, expertise, resources, and political sup-
port, and the need to fine-tune policies and rules to accommodate the
far greater diversity of the regulated domain. When those high de-
mands are not met, regulatory failure, igniting intense political con-
troversy, is likely.
32
Second, social regulation entails many of the same kinds of un-
desirable consequences as economic regulation, while spreading those
consequences across far larger sectors of the economy. The costs of
complying with uniform standards, whether those of the Environmen-
31. For the classic exposition of the theory that regulation was advanced at the behest
of large corporations in order to frustrate competition, see G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965), and G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963). The
historical accounts in The Politics of Regulation tend to support Wilson's conclusion
that recent scholarship "demolish[es]" Kolko's argument. Wilson, supra note 1, at 365 n.9.
32. See Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, 11 NAT'L J. 711, 711-17 (1979).
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tal Protection Agency or of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are
similar in character. They often render marginal firms unprofitable,
discourage new entry and investment, stifle innovation, regressively
tax consumers when passed on in product prices, diminish consumer
choice, surround capital investment decisions with great uncertain-
ties, and violate norms of horizontal equity. This is not to deny that
social regulation often generates benefits; doubtless it does, although
available data do not establish conclusively or even persuasively that
benefits always exceed costs. 3 3 The point here is that those costs are
no less problematic simply because the regulation is social rather than
economic. If anything, the contrary is true.34
Third, social regulation seeks to advance many ends-for example,
life, health, racial equality, ecological balance-that cannot readily be
objectively valued. Even if a satisfactory method for doing so existed,
any effort to quantify explicitly those ends or to trade them off against
others would be highly vulnerable to political attack as callous, indiffer-
ent to human suffering, and subservient to corporate interests.3 5 Be-
cause those ends are embraced with special, even theological, fervor and
are couched in the constraint-denying language of "rights, ' 36 social
regulation often assumes a highly ideological, uncompromising charac-
33. See, e.g., L. BACow, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 24-50 (1980); T.
SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RECONSIDERED 34-39 (1975). On the other hand, the data
typically fail to establish conclusively that benefits do not exceed costs. See Schuck,
supra note 32, at 711-12. Given limitations on information and on the conclusiveness of
cost-benefit analysis of most programs of social regulation, perhaps the most that can
be said is that there are strong reasons to doubt that all social regulation is worth
what it costs.
34. Because of the broad sweep of environmental and workplace regulation, the costs
of even small or isolated inefficiencies in such efforts could loom quite large relative to
those of a clearly inefficient program of economic regulation, such as surface transpor-
tation regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is especially true for
environmental regulation, which often requires extensive capital investment. Thus, the
welfare loss associated with the ICC railroad regulation was estimated at 5742 million
per year as of 1972. See Levin, Railroad Rates, Profitability and Welfare Under Deregu-
lation (forthcoming 12 BELL J. EcoN. (1981)). In contrast, the costs of meeting a single
proposed environmental standard, that for ozone, was estimated by the Council on Wage
and Price Stability in the range of $14.3 to $18.8 billion per year, with no demonstrated
gains in long-term health effects. See Council on Wage and Price Stability, Report of
the Regulatory Analysis Review Group 2 (Oct. 16, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated the costs of meeting its New Source
Performance Standard for coal-fired utilities to be $4.1 billion in 1995. In their recent
study, Ackerman and Hassler concluded that this standard will in fact exacerbate air
pollution in certain parts of the country. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal:
Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1540-41 (1980).
35. See, e.g., M. GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, supra note 30, at 63-75 (criticizing use of
market incentives and cost-benefit analyses to determine allocation of health, safety, and
environmental protection).
36. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEaRousLY at xi (1978) (possession of rights per-
mits individuals to trump collective goals).
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ter that encourages efforts to expand and to perfect regulatory controls
with little regard to costs.
37
Fourth, quite apart from the nature of its ends, the types of risks
with which social regulation is increasingly concerned-for example,
the dangers of environmental or biological insults, of invidious dis-
crimination, of offenses to one's personal integrity33-are often diffi-
cult to identify, or literally invisible. In an important sense, their
very existence may be a function of precarious scientific judgments,
the state of laboratory technology, and ill-defined or inconsistent pub-
lic attitudes towards uncertainty. The contingent, evanescent charac-
ter of these risks, the fundamental human values that they impli-
cate, and the large number of people affected ensure that the politics
of regulating these risks will be volatile. They will be rooted less
in fact and analysis than in theory and ipse dixit, less in reasoned
inferences from human experience than in extrapolations from tran-
sitory and inevitably speculative laboratory findings. The question,
"How high shall the rate of return to natural gas producers be?" is
a formidable intellectual and political problem, but the question,
"How safe shall the air be?" is far more controversial and elusive.
Finally, the unusual difficulty in predicting outcomes of health, safe-
ty, and other social regulation tends to create a broad zone of uncer-
tainty and subjective judgment in which regulators' redistributive
efforts, inefficient as such schemes may be, will nonetheless flourish.39
To the extent, then, that social regulation supplements or sup-
plants economic regulation, regulatory struggle assumes new, more
polarizing forms that yield less readily to persuasion, compromise, and
other conventional processes of political accommodation.
Changing Patterns of Market Failure. The legitimacy of economic
and social regulation is anchored in different kinds of market failure.
The former is usually premised, rightly or wrongly, on the existence
of a natural monopoly, the risk of "destructive competition," the
ability of producers to extract rents, or the need to allocate scarcity.
40
Social regulation, in contrast, is ordinarily justified by the need to
37. See Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 85-91 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 46 Fed.
Reg. 8,386-91 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124).
39. R. ZECKHAUSER, USING THE WRONG ToOL 9-11 (1981). An interesting implication
of Zeckhauser's analysis appears to be that regulators bent upon redistribution will often
refrain from seeking to improve their information.
40. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 547, 553-60 (1979) (reviewing market failure justifications
for economic regulation).
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correct externalities, improve information, override socially pernicious
preferences, redress inequalities in bargaining power, or ensure that
services purchased with public funds meet minimum standards. 41
The demand for regulation during the 1970s has reflected a new
configuration of market failures and new public attitudes towards
those failures. In this changed context, traditional market-failure jus-
tifications for economic regulation are increasingly suspect. Techno-
logical advances have eliminated certain apparent market failures,
unleashing vital economic forces in industries long thought to be un-
suited to competition. Electronic funds-transfer systems, for example,
have made sluggish, artificially segmented financial institutions both
fiercely competitive and increasingly innovative. Cablecasting and
other technologies have rendered obsolete the scarcity justification for
restriction of broadcasting franchises by the Federal Communications
Commission. A host of telecommunications entrepreneurs are success-
fully eroding AT&T's "natural monopoly" in microwave transmission. 42
Similarly, fears that unregulated industrial concentration would
cause poor market performance have been somewhat allayed by a "new
learning" stressing the importance of scale efficiencies, international
competition, and other market-strengthening conditions.43 Finally,
chronic inflation has increasingly come to be viewed as a special kind
of market failure for which price controls, the conventional nostrum
of economic regulation, would be a poor remedy.44 In short, struc-
tural changes in the economy have seriously undermined the theory
and practice of economic regulation.
Social regulation, in contrast, responds to very different conditions.
The kinds of market failure that purport to justify social regulation
are now more prevalent, not less. In an interdependent, urban society,
externalities are ubiquitous. Urbanization implies that one's activities
are more likely to affect one's neighbors, and to do so in ways that
cause social and private welfare to diverge. The level of these ex-
ternalities, however, is not simply a function of such physical or geo-
graphical variables. It also reflects more fundamental changes in public
preferences and attitudes. Regulation of smoking in public areas,
41. See M. GREEN 8: N. WAITZMAN, supra note 30, at 7-17 (reviewing market failure
justifications for social regulation).
42. See Breyer, supra note 40, at 599-603.
43. See generally INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston
eds. 1974).
44. See M. KosTRs, CONTROLS AND INFLATIO N 109-17 (1975). It is a striking confirmation
of the ill repute in which economic regulation is increasingly held that persistent double-
digit inflation has led to few calls, even by politicians of the left, for reimposition of
wage-price controls.
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for example, has not become politically salient simply because of re-
search demonstrating adverse health effects upon nonsmokers (that
link was always suspected), or because per capita smoking has in-
creased (it has actually declined). Rather, nonsmokers have grown
less tolerant of smokers, and have acquired the numerical strength to
work their will in legislative arenas. Other consumption decisions that
in an earlier day were considered entirely a private affair are today
thought to affect the welfare of the larger society, even in the ab-
sence of any physical interaction. Whether those responses reflect in-
creased altruism or greater officiousness, the universe of such "merit"
goods and bads, thought to justify public efforts to influence con-
sumption patterns, has steadily grown. And one form of intervention
leads almost inexorably to others. Thus, health care for the poor was
originally subsidized as a merit good. Once public dollars were
involved, however, health care quickly became a highly regulated
activity.-15
Objective conditions and attitudinal changes have conspired to cre-
ate or to exacerbate other kinds of market failure. The pronounced
separation of production and consumption in a technologically so-
phisticated society, for example, has left consumers poorly informed
about much that they consume and relatively ill-equipped to evaluate
nonobvious risks.46 Moreover, society increasingly values public goods,
such as clean air and equal justice, that the market cannot ade-
quately provide, and rejects a distribution of income thought to af-
fect market behavior in undesirable ways.
Taken together, these longrun changes in social conditions and pref-
erences suggest that, while the kinds of market failure that have tra-
ditionally supported economic regulation are receding in importance,
those thought to justify social regulation are proliferating rapidly. To
the extent that disputes over economic and social regulation impli-
cate different interests, conditions, issues, processes, and dimensions
45. See, e.g., National Health Planning and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§
30Oe-4, 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (establishing national health planning and de-
velopment programs); Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 249F, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c
to 1320c-19 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (establishing Professional Standards Review Organi-
zation).
46. One court made this observation in the following way:
Advances in the technologies of materials, of processes, of operational means have put
it almost entirely out of the reach of the consumer to comprehend why or how
the article operates, and thus even farther out of his reach to detect when there may
be a defect or a danger present in its design or manufacture.
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121
(1976).
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of conflict, these developments imply a fundamental transformation
in the politics of regulation now and in the future.
Institutional Environment. Social regulation, I have maintained,
is a broad, surging current fed by powerful tributaries. It is possible,
however, that this current could be dammed or diverted. Regulation,
after all, possesses its own characteristic shortcomings-Charles Wolf
has labeled these "non-market failures" 47-and the contemporary poli-
tics of regulation demonstrates that the existence of regulatory failure
has become widely acknowledged. Despite these realities, however, the
institutions that increasingly shape our politics-public interest or-
ganizations, national media, Congress, and government bureaucracies
-seem far more likely, at least in the long run, to propel the regu-
latory tide than to restrain it.
An influential sector of nonprofit organizations staffed by a cadre
of effective political activists has, in a few short years, radically al-
tered the dramatis personae and scope of regulatory debate.4 8 Due
largely to their success in advocating legal reforms and developing new
fundraising practices, their effective access to the political process, as
Wilson observes, has been dramatically increased in the last decade
or two.49 Many of these groups have strong vested interests-ideolog-
ical, political, and economic-in maintaining and expanding social
regulation, especially those programs that they helped to establish.
Their position will be buttressed by more conventional allies: regu-
lated interests sheltered or nourished by the program,5° industries
whose products or services would be needed to comply with regula-
tory standards, 51 and labor unions whose members' jobs and wage levels
are thought to be protected by the program. 52 Groups with growing
demographic importance and political power, such as blacks, His-
panics, and the elderly, seem likely to demand additional protection
from the depredations of both marketplace and bureaucracy.
The editorial and reportorial content of the national media tends
47. Wolf, A Theory of Non-Market Failure, PuB. INTEREsT, Spring 1979, at 114.
48. See A. MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES 2-4 (1976); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 177-78 (1974); Schuck, Public Interest Groups and the Policy
Process, 37 PUB. AD. REv. 132, 133-34 (1977).
49. Wilson, supra note 1, at 385-86.
50. These need not be corporate entities, but may include the "helping professions"
and others whose services are demanded by the program. See, e.g., M. DERTHICK, UNCON-
TROLLABLE SPENDING FOR SOCIAL SERVICES GRANTS 113 (1975) (HEW officials administering
state grants needed protection against professional social workers as well as politicians).
51. These may include manufacturers of pollution control equipment, lawyers, ac-
countants, and the like.
52. See Behrman, supra note 15, at 117 (airline labor "vehemently opposed" to regu-
latory reform or deregulation).
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to be liberal, cosmopolitan, critical of existing institutions and so-
cial conditions, and sympathetic to the reformist agenda. The de-
bunking of established authority and institutions, the ideology of sec-
ular humanism, and the pursuit of social reform are the warp and
woof of network news and public-affairs programming. These influ-
ences have almost certainly guided the public's political conscious-
ness toward those values.53 A conservative administration, especially
one of avowedly parochial orientation, will provide even more grist for
the adversary journalist's mill.
Fueled by an extraordinary profusion of staff resources, 54 Congress
has become a powerful engine of social regulation. Members of the
congressional committees with responsibility for an established pro-
gram tend to possess strong personal, political, and policy interests
in its continuation and growth. Important new regulatory statutes are
unlikely to be enacted in the wake of the 1980 elections, but this
seems less significant than the fact that ample, not-yet-exploited regu-
latory authority is already on the books. Indeed, far-reaching regula-
tions, carrying multibillion dollar price tags, are already scheduled
for issuance in the early 1980s. 5
Short-term political appointees, like members of Congress them-
selves, cannot easily contain this dynamic process. Many regulations are
mandated by existing law. Others are justified by the plausible and con-
servative, albeit often illusory, purpose of improving the effective-
ness of those controls already in place. 6 Moreover, one need not sub-
scribe to reductionist theories of bureaucracy to recognize that the
career officials who administer a regulatory program tend to have
personal and professional stakes in its survival and success, however
measured, and to identify intensely with its goals. Finally, mounting
budgetary pressures, which will intensify if congressional or consti-
tutional limits on spending are adopted, tempt hard-pressed officials
to accomplish important political and policy objectives by extracting
private expenditures through regulation rather than through direct
expenditure of scarce public funds.5 7
53. See E. EPsTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 200-36 (1973).
54. See Mf. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 9-19 (1980).
55. See, e.g., Clark, If Reagan Wants to Trump the Regulators, Here's OMB's Target
List for Openers. 13 NAT'L J. 94 (1981). President Reagan's 60-day freeze on the issuance
of new regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227-28 (1981), does not apply to the independent
regulatory agencies. Its long-term impact remains to be seen.
56. E.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-261, 92 Stat. 3352 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. III 1979)).
57. See, e.g., C. DeMuth, Regulatory Costs and the "Regulatory Budget" 6-7 (Dec.
1979) (unpublished Faculty Project on Regulation, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University).
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None of this is to say, of course, that the outcome of any particular
regulatory struggle is preordained or that regulatory growth is inex-
orable. The instances of deregulation, largely confined thus far to
the realm of economic regulation, testify eloquently to the contrary.
So do some early actions of the Reagan administration. Nevertheless,
the interests supporting regulation will often prevail, especially where
the struggle is waged in the administrative and judicial arenas, in
which they are more influential, rather than in the legislative arena.
III
Wilson wishes to clear away the intellectual debris left by this whirl-
wind of change, and to fashion in its stead a theoretical framework
that can better account for the raging political battles over regulation.
He advances somewhat ambivalent claims for his construction. Es-
chewing any pretense to rigor, assuring us that the "discipline" of
political science is "as inelegant, disorderly, and changeable as its sub-
ject matter,"58 he nonetheless aspires to identify "continuities, if not
cosmic generalizations" about regulation.5 9 Indeed, he hopes to ap-
proach "[a] complete theory of regulatory politics."' ° This confusion
is heightened by Wilson's failure to clarify precisely what it is that
his generalizations are supposed to explain.6 '
A "complete theory of regulatory politics," or even a comprehensive
set of "continuities," would seek to explain at least the following phe-
nomena: the appearance of a regulatory proposal on the political
agenda; the ability of that issue to attain priority over all the other
issues pressing for recognition and resolution by the political system;
the adoption of the proposal in a particular legislative or administra-
tive form; its subsequent institutionalization in an administrative
milieu; the staffing patterns for the regulatory program; the substan-
tive decisions resulting from the regulatory activities; and the pro-
gram's evolution, which occasionally leads to its eventual demise.
The essays in Wilson's book cast a somewhat uneven light on these
matters, illuminating some and neglecting others. The chapter on elec-
tric utility regulation, for example, presents a rather confusing, apo-
58. Wilson, supra note 1, at 363.
59. Id. at 391.
60. Id. at 372.
61. Wilson affirms that "[a]nyone who purports to explain the behavior of regulatory
agencies must first make clear what behavior is worth explaining." Id. at 372. Wilson
himself fails to do so, however, noting only that "industry-serving bchavior"--an ambiguous
and problematic concept in its own right-is too narrow a focus. Id. at 372-73.
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litical picture of its political origins. Utility tycoon Samuel Insull,
we are told, advocated state regulation of his industry "as an alter-
native to local competition and political bargaining. ' 62 Several ob-
vious questions are ignored: Why would a local utility like Common-
wealth Electric not have preferred regulation at the municipal level,
which was within the orbit of its influence? Why did Insull, contrary
to other utility entrepreneurs, not fear municipal ownership? 3 Why
did industrial and commercial consumers of power, presumably in-
fluential advocates for stringent regulation, play no discernible po-
litical role? Despite such omissions, however, the book as a whole
provides an important corrective to reductionist explanations of regu-
latory origins. Its case studies, for example, reveal that some agencies,
such as the Civil Aeronautics Board, were created as a result of political
pressures from the regulated industry, 4 that some, such as the Ship-
ping Board, now the Federal Maritime Commission, were established
over the industry's fierce opposition, 5 and that others, such as the
Office of Civil Rights, began without regulated interests being much
involved one way or the other. 6
Wilson's most distinctive contribution to regulatory theory is his
effort to systematize this diversity. Constructing a four-cell matrix
based on the distribution of the costs and benefits of any particular
regulatory scheme,07 Wilson distinguishes four "political situations"
that reflect different patterns in which issues are generated and coali-
tions formed. Majoritarian politics occurs when both costs and bene-
fits are widely distributed; the Social Security and Sherman Acts are
offered as examples.08 In this mode, interest-group activity is minimal,
presumably because of organizational "free-rider" problems. 69 Inter-
est-group politics occurs when both costs and benefits are narrowly
distributed; the labor laws and the Shipping Act are mentioned.
70
Here, specialized but highly motivated interests compete; typically,
the result is compromise. Client politics occurs when costs are widely
distributed but benefits are concentrated; state licensing laws are
62. Anderson, State Regulation of Electric Utilities, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
at 3, 6.
63. See id. at 6-7.
64. See Behrman, supra note 15, at 79-85.
65. See Mansfield, Federal Maritime Commission, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION at
42, 43-48.
66. See Rabkin, supra note 21, at 309-12, 335-37.
67. Wilson, supra note 1, at 366-67.
68. Id. at 367-68.
69. See M. OLSON, supra note 9, at 14-15.
70. Wilson, supra note 1, at 368. But cf. Mansfield, supra note 65, at 47 (Shipping Act
enacted under conditions of majoritarian politics).
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cited.' 1 Ordinarily, the special interests that benefit have the field to
themselves, as the cost-bearing consumers or taxpayers have little in-
centive to organize in opposition. Finally, entrepreneurial politics
occurs when benefits are widely distributed and costs are highly con-
centrated; environmental and auto-safety regulation are given as ex-
amples. In this mode, a political entrepreneur like Ralph Nader or
Estes Kefauver somehow manages to mobilize diffuse public concerns
and to overcome strong resistance by the regulated sector.7 2
This typology is both original and provocative,7 3 suggesting patterns
of regulatory behavior far richer and more complex than those con-
jured up by the bromidic axioms of capture theory. Emphasizing
the importance of the motivations of regulatory officials, Wilson un-
covers further layers of meaning in regulatory behavior. Thus, he dis-
tinguishes among careerists motivated by organizational bureaucratic
concerns; politicians ambitious for higher appointive or elective of-
fice; and professionals responsive to norms and interests emanating
from the larger occupational community outside the agency.
74 This
analysis is buttressed by two excellent case studies-one on the Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department, 75 the other on the Federal
Trade Commission 76-that demonstrate how agency routines, case se-
lection, interbureau conflict, and regulatory policies are shaped by
the distinctive training, professional orientation, and career paths of
staff lawyers and economists. Analyses of the Office of Civil Rights
and of the airline-deregulation controversy also remind us that aca-
demic theories and politically unconventional ideas can profoundly
influence the course of administrative law and regulatory realpolitik.
Despite these considerable virtues, however, Wilson's analytical con-
struct is ultimately of little value to one who would predict regula-
tory behavior rather than simply explain it ex post. Most of the im-
portant questions remain unanswered and many new ones are raised.
Thus, Wilson suggests that entrepreneurial politics has become a com-
71. Wilson, supra note 1, at 369-70. In noting that the origins of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and state public utility commissions differ from the predicted pattern of client
politics, id. at 369, Wilson indirectly acknowledges that his categories do not adequately
explain the complexities of regulatory politics.
72. Id. at 370-71.
73. For an earlier elaboration of Wilson's typology, see Wilson, The Politics of Regu-
lation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BusINESS PREDICAMENT 135, 141-46 (J. McKie ed.
1974).
74. Wilson, supra note 1, at 374-82.
75. Weaver, Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, in THE POLITICS OF
REGuLATION at 123.
76. Katzmann, supra note 24, at 152.
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mon feature of regulatory life,77 yet that hardly constitutes a theory
or even an explanation. The political arena, after all, has always been
thick with policy entrepreneurs: congressional staffers searching for
a "big issue," special interest lobbyists stalking competitive advantage
or special benefits, public interest advocates pursuing their visions of
reform, and journalists hoping to develop a long-running front-page
story. Why do some flourish while others go out of business? Why
did that quintessential policy entrepreneur, Ralph Nader, strike oil
with auto safety and wholesome meat regulation, but drill dry holes
with corporate chartering, tax reform, and proposals for a consumer
protection agency? If regulatory legislation is often preceded by "scan-
dal" or "crisis," as Wilson suggests, 78 what factors determine which
events are so characterized and which are not?
The answers to these questions probably have much to do with the
modes of political discourse to which different kinds of regulatory
issues lend themselves, and with the ways in which the mass media,
a formidable influence that Wilson scarcely mentions, choose to treat
such issues. Some regulatory issues are more susceptible to vivid and
simplified presentation than others. A congressional hearing at which
the diseased lungs of deceased coal miners are exhibited is gripping
theater; the consequences of other, equally insidious environmental
insults are less dramatically conveyed. As with any market commodity,
the demand for entrepreneurship waxes and wanes; popular appe-
tites for apocalypse, crisis, outrage, and reform evidently can become
surfeited.
Wilson's typology also begs important questions. He correctly ob-
serves that values in political life are not given, but emerge only in
the course of political processes.7 9 This truth, however, necessarily im-
plies that actors often cannot know a priori what counts as a cost or
a benefit to them. Evaluation not only precedes, but grows out of,
political action. Moreover, the very identity of costs and benefits,
not merely their distribution, will often be opaque at each stage of
the regulatory process. Any regulated industry experiences a configura-
tion of costs and benefits that is complex and in constant flux and re-
definition. The "oil industry" is in fact a congeries of producers, pipe-
lines, refiners, resellers, jobbers, retailers, dealers, brokers, and other
groups selling to an even more diverse, array of users. Not only do
the interests of those groups clash, but each is itself extremely hetero-
77. Wilson, supra note 1, at 370.
78. Id. at 371.
79. Id. at 363.
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geneous, with interests varying according to geographical location,
product mix, historical marketing pattern, and a host of other attri-
butes. For Wilson's typology to be at all serviceable, one must first
know how broadly or narrowly the costs and benefits of regulation
will be distributed in the myriad, constantly changing markets that
the constellations of these groups create. That knowledge, needless
to say, would be devilishly hard to come by.
And even if we assume that a discrete, well-defined market can be
isolated for analysis, what do we really know of the regulatory costs
and benefits? If social science has established anything during the
last decade, surely it is that regulation of complex markets and in-
stitutions produces many unpredictable, uncontrolled consequences."
And passing the rather awesome empirical questions of what a reg-
ulation's effects will be and which of those effects should count as
costs and as benefits, it remains a matter of singular difficulty to de-
termine who in fact will ultimately bear them. Who, for example,
will bear the costs of complying with regulations requiring certain
federally assisted hospitals to provide uncompensated care to the poor?""
The hospital's donors? Its employees? Its uninsured patients? Blue
Cross subscribers in the community? Those ill persons turned away
as a result? Overcrowded municipal hospitals?" '
If the answers to the distributional questions are not straightfor-
ward ones, how are we to apply Wilson's typology at all? Perhaps
we could observe which organizations favor a particular regulatory
proposal and which oppose it, and could then simply infer the actual
distribution of costs and benefits from that configuration of interests.
But in order to pursue that strategy, we would need to wait until
the lines were drawn and the armies massed; at that point, Wilson's
matrix could only confirm what we already knew. To put the dilemma
another way, the matrix could come into play as a plausible predic-
tive device only when either we can answer a number of questions
that are unlikely, in the interesting cases, to be answerable, or we
are prepared to make extremely simplistic assumptions about the
probable consequences of a regulatory proposal.8 3 Still, for all its in-
80. See, e.g., S. BRAYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 20, at 121-24 (Federal Power Com-
mission regulation benefited some consumers but not others; natural gas price regulation
produced harmful shortages).
81. 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.501-.607 (1979).
82. See Note, The Hill-Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health
Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REv. 316, 367-74 (1979) (discussing distribution of costs of
uncompensated care).
83. Wilson also leaves unanswered the question of whether his typology is meant to
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determinacies and gaps, Wilson's analysis of regulatory politics re-
mains the most sophisticated account of this quotidian phenomenon
that we possess, a telling commentary on the impoverished state of
our contemporary political theory.
IV
Regulatory politics without the courts is like Hamlet without-Po-
lonius. Yet Wilson and his collaborators apparently attach importance
only to those relatively infrequent occasions on which courts adjudi-
cate a regulatory dispute, and simply lament the case-by-case, un-
certainty-enhancing character of judicial review of regulatory actions.
8 4
The influence of the courts on the regulatory process, however, al-
though easily exaggerated (especially by lawyers), is more systematic.
In conjunction with Congress and the agencies, courts embed regu-
latory conflicts in particular procedural structures. In their own right,
courts clothe an agency's policy judgments in the legitimating mantle
of principle, an especially important function in those situations in
which exercises of broad, legislative-type discretion, rather than ad-
judications, are under review. Indeed, Congress would not, and con-
stitutionally perhaps could not, confer broad decisional authority upon
the agencies unless it were confident that Article III courts would
confine exercises of that authority within statutory and constitutional
limits.8 5 In a number of respects, then, courts form essential parts of
the institutional background against which allocations of regulatory
power are made, evaluated, and legitimated.
Even at the more mundane level of reviewing particular regula-
tory decisions, courts may influence regulatory politics in important
ways. First, courts define the nature of the decisionmaking process
by prescribing how regulatory issues are to be raised and resolved.
Although often procedural and technical in form, such judicial de-
cisions may nevertheless have far-reaching substantive implications.
Thus, by insisting that an administrative decision employ certain
procedures, a court may affect the interests that are represented, the
describe the politics of regulatory legislation, of postenactment regulatory administra-
tion, or both. The political forces shaping each of those processes will often be quite
different.
84. Wilson, supra note 1, at 390.
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 (1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concur-
ring). But see Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958) (when
agency's duty to act depends on inference from "large or loose statutory terms," construc-
tion of statute committed to agency discretion).
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record that is developed, the weight to be accorded agency expertise,
and the appropriateness of political influences on the substantive
outcome.
In addition, courts influence what resources and remedies are avail-
able to participants in the regulatory process. By deciding which in-
terests have standing to challenge agency action, when litigation costs
may be shifted between parties, to which types of information par-
ticipants may have access, and under which circumstances private
citizens may proceed directly against a regulated firm, courts rede-
sign the political process and environment in which the agency ex-
ercises regulatory power.
Courts also define the contours of the agency's regulatory discre-
tion. By deciding which issues an agency may or must resolve and
which criteria of decision constrain it, the court in effect allocates
regulatory power between legislature, court, agency, and citizens. In-
deed, by construing the agency's discretion very narrowly, the court
may effectively determine a policy decision. And when a court com-
pels a reluctant agency to enforce statutory rights, it shifts the bal-
ance of power among those private interests affected by the agency's
authority."s
Finally, and more generally, courts constitute a significant strategic
resource, for the mere availability of judicial review is an important
weapon in regulatory conflict. Each element ancillary to judicial re-
view of a regulatory decision-the delay, the expense, the probability
of particular substantive outcomes, the imposition on the dispute of
judicial forms of resolution-advantages certain interests at the ex-
pense of others.
In each instance, courts influence the structure and substance of
regulatory politics in ways that have little to do with the analytical
categories employed by Wilson's distributional matrix, but instead re-
ify a conception of appropriate judicial role. That conception in turn
reflects the court's confidence in a particular agency's decision pro-
cesses, the extent to which the issue seems to demand the specialized
expertise that an agency may be thought to possess, and the par-
ticular functions-among those discussed above-that the court feels
obliged to perform.
The chief architects of administrative law, most notably the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have not yet em-
braced any consistent conception of judicial role in the review of in-
86. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ordering HEW to
begin compliance reviews and enforcement proceedings after finding agency "derelict in
[its) duty to enforce Title VI").
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creasingly complex regulatory decisions.87 In view of the competing
values at stake and the diverse factors affecting agency decisionmaking,
they are unlikely to do so in the future. It is all the more striking,
then, that several of the regulatory reform proposals that have at-
tracted political support envision a significantly enhanced role for
the courts in the regulatory process.ss Not the least of the ironies of
the recent conservative triumph may well be a new spasm of judicial
activism in administrative law, one precipitated by a Congress de-
termined to use the courts as a weapon in the regulatory battles of
the 1980s.
V
In the end, the politics of regulation turns less on the dynamics
of coalition formation, the behavior of regulatory officials, or the
rulings of courts, important as these are, than on the dominant vi-
sion of the larger society in which nationally organized interests,
policy entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and courts are merely highly spe-
cialized, and often unrepresentative, manifestations. That vision en-
compasses a conception of the good society and of the place of the
citizen in that society, a notion of the proper boundaries between
public and private, and of the appropriate domains of community
norms and individual freedom. That vision, whatever its content, ul-
timately prescribes the tolerance within which conventional regula-
tory politics can be conducted.
Any politics of regulation surely must be directed first and fore-
most to these fundamental questions of individual autonomy and so-
cial purpose. Significantly, it is this "metapolitics" of regulation that
has been transformed in recent decades. One regrets, then, that Wil-
son, after acknowledging the importance of ideas to regulatory poli-
tics, leaves it at that. Ideology thus remains as so much unexplained
variance, as a black box. Yet it seems clear that a new public philosophy
has deeply eroded the traditional, ideological restraints upon the
objects and intrusiveness of regulatory intervention-restraints based,
perhaps, on notions of federalism, of limits of law, of individual re-
sponsibility, or of unacceptable levels of "non-market failure." Until
quite recently-and long after economic regulation had become a
prominent component of our public law-it remained almost incon-
ceivable that problems of sexual harassment in the workplace,89 the
87. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., and Leventhal, J., concurring).
88. See note 5 supra (citing recently introduced congressional bills).
89. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676-77 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
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conduct of behavioral research, 90 and the editorial policies of maga-
zine publishers,9' to select some recent examples, would be subject
to national rules and potential legal sanctions. Such interventions,
however, have become commonplace, suggesting that any limits to the
utopian sweep of the regulatory vision are evidently limits of politi-
cal expediency, not of principle. Transitory, elastic, and highly vul-
nerable to momentary shifts in the winds of public opinion, those
boundaries cannot readily withstand the long term pressures to ex-
tend regulation's reach.
What is the source of those sparks that so readily ignite the regu-
latory tinder? Doubtless there are many, but a few seem especially
significant. First, American society has for the past fifteen years ex-
perienced the continuous exigencies of war, economic turmoil, and
social change. These conditions are perennially the most dependable
precursors and powerful progenitors of statism. Dislocations in energy
markets spawned a vast regulatory system, thrusting governmental
power, and thus political conflict, into the very core of the nation's
economic decisionmaking apparatus. Persistent inflation growing out
of war-related deficits precipitated three years of extensive wage-price
controls, with a legacy of encompassing regulation in increasingly criti-
cal economic sectors, such as health care.9 2 Newly mobilized social
groups have pressed their claims for equal treatment, and in some cases
preference, through civil rights regulations. 93
Second, the ineffectiveness of much regulation has encouraged its
expansion, confirming the cynic's observation that nothing succeeds
like failure. The failure of natural gas price regulation did not pre-
vent its extension to the previously unregulated intrastate market.
94
Similarly, the inability of state certificate-of-need laws to contain hos-
pital costs has led both to the expansion of their regulatory jurisdic-
tion to cover physicians' offices and specialized nonhospital facilities,
and to rate or revenue controls over hospitals.95 This "tar-baby ef-
90. See 46 Fed. Reg. 8,386-91 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.124).
91. See Pound, 2 Publishers Accuse U.S. Election Agency of Rights Violations, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
92. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976
& Supp. III 1979); National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
93. See Schuck, supra note 37, at 29 n.14.
94. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-261, 92 Stat. 3352 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. III 1979)).
95. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 568H-568Z (1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAWV
§§ 2803, 2807-2808 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976-77); H.R. 2626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(J 9 7 9) (Hospital Cost Containment Act). See generally U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
CONTROLLING RISING HOSPITAL COSTS (1979) (discussing state and federal proposals).
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fect," as it has aptly been called,96 has been observed in many other
regulatory contexts, and its causes-political risk-aversion on the part
of regulators, the desire to control the unanticipated consequences of
existing regulation, redistributive efforts, and considerations of hori-
zontal equityT-are persistent and systematic.
Third, as discussed above, powerful elements of American society
have acquired a considerable vested interest in the continuation and
expansion of regulation, and a transformed reality has lent plausi-
bility to their alarums of market failure. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, American society appears to have come to a new view
of the role and possibilities of law and politics in the pursuit of the
good society. Until quite recently, Americans regarded inequalities,
dashed hopes, and personal misfortunes not as pervasive social in-
justices to be extirpated but as discrete obstacles-due to the will of
God, the victim's own deficiencies, or simple bad luck-to be sur-
mounted by individual effort or endured with stoic resignation. Even
if a condition were regarded as intolerable, a federal regulatory statute
would have seemed a most unlikely instrument of reform.
Today, in contrast, injustices are readily perceived, their trac-
tability is widely assumed, and collective intervention by legal rule
appears to be the remedy of choice. As our perception of imperfec-
tion has grown, our tolerance for it has diminished. These attitudes
no doubt reflect a complex evolution in morality, ideas, and politics.
Whatever their cultural sources, they have fused in a melioristic, not
to say utopian, ambition to reform a disagreeable social reality through
the affirmative application of public power. That impulse has vir-
tually obliterated the moral, constitutional, and political boundaries
that once contained it, and the social consensus that once domesti-
cated it.9S In shaping the human and institutional materials standing
between that energizing impulse and that beckoning vision of social
justice, however, we are limited to the same old tools: politics, law,
and administration. 9 If past is indeed prologue, there is precious little
reason to believe, but much reason to hope, that those crude instru-
ments can be made equal to the increasingly demanding tasks that
will be set for them.
96. See McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries, I BELL
J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT SCr. 6, 9 (1970).
97. Wilson, supra note I, at 377.
98. For a somewhat analogous analysis attempting to explain an asserted increased
failure by the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication, see Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 223-29 (1968).
99. See J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 161-62 (1973); Schuck, supra
note 32, at 19-20.
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